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#2A-l/ll/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK and THE UNION OF FEDERATED 
CORRECTION OFFICERS. 
Respondents, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7375 
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION. SECURITY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES. DISTRICT COUNCIL 82. 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL 
SERVICES and OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS). 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-73 85 
THE UNION OF FEDERATED CORRECTION OFFICERS, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION. SECURITY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS. ESQ. (Richard J. Dautner. Esq.. of counsel), 
for Respondent State of New York, Governor's Office of 
Employee Relations 
JEFFREY H. BROZYNA, ESQ.. for Charging Party The Union of 
Federated Correction Officers 
ROWLEY. FORREST AND O'DONNELL. P.C. (Brian J. O'Donnell. Esq., 
of counsel), for Charging Party/Intervenor Council 82 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
, 9454 
The two improper practice charges herein grow out of 
the same series of incidents and they were consolidated for 
hearing and decision.— The incidents involve actions by 
The Union of Federated Correction Officers (TUFCO) to 
solicit employees of New York State in the Security 
Services Unit at the Fishkill Correctional Facility and at 
other correctional facilities in violation of a rule of the 
State on organizational activities. That rule provides for 
equal access to State premises among competing employee 
organizations for the purpose of soliciting employee 
support during the campaign period. Defining this period, 
it further provides: 
... the campaign period shall begin no 
earlier than 90 days prior to the date 
upon which the incumbent organization's 
representation status is subject to 
challenge under Section 208 of the 
Taylor Law. 
The incidents also involve the State's reaction to TUFCO's 
actions by. among other things, confiscating designation 
cards collected by TUFCO at Fishkill on March 4. 1984. 
i^There was a third related charge that was covered 
by the consolidated decision. The Administrative Law 
Judge dismissed that charge on the ground that the record 
did not support its allegations of fact. The charging 
party has not filed any exceptions to that dismissal. 
Accordingly, that charge is not before us. 
9455 
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The first charge was by New York State Inspection, 
Security and Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 
82, American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO (DC 82). It alleges that TUFCO violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Lawjby_J^ter^xJjig_j?ith_ijt_s_r-i:gh-t 
of quiet enjoyment of its status as the certified 
representative of the Security Services Unit by soliciting 
support for a challenge to its right of representation in 
violation of the State's rule. The Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissed this charge on the ground that TUFCO 
has no Taylor Law obligation to comply with the State's 
2 / 
rule. DC 82 has filed exceptions to that decision.— 
The second charge was filed by TUFCO. It complains 
that the State violated §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law by 
confiscating designation cards which it had solicited in 
violation of the State's rule. The ALJ determined that the 
confiscation of the cards was a violation of the statute; 
he ordered the State to cease and desist from such 
activities and to return the confiscated cards. Both the 
State and DC 82. which was permitted to intervene in the 
matter, have filed exceptions to the ALJ's finding of 
^ T h i s charge also alleged that the State improperly 
failed to enforce its own rule, but the exceptions do not 
address the ALJ's dismissal of this specification. 
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a violation.— TUFCO, in turn, filed exceptions in which 
it argues that the ALJ's remedy is inadequate. 
The sole issue presented by DC 82's exceptions to the 
AL J's dismissal of the first charge is whether TUFCO had a 
Taylor Law obligation to comply with the JLta te ls_r uXe_. 
TUFCO violated this rule by entering upon the State 
premises for the purpose of soliciting support as early as 
150 days prior to the expiration of DC 82's period of 
unchallenged representation. 
The ALJ ruled that TUFCO's violation of the State's 
unilaterally established access rules is not a violation of 
the Taylor Law. We agree. In State of New York. 10 PERB 
1P108 (1977), we held that the State's denial of access to 
a challenging employee organization within 90 days of the 
expiration of the incumbent organization's period of 
unchallenged representation was a violation of the Taylor 
Law. In doing so, we noted that this conduct was also 
violative of the State's own manual. 
•3/This charge also alleged that the State acted 
improperly by threatening the offending employees with 
discipline and otherwise coercing them because of their 
violations of the rule. The ALJ dismissed these 
specifications of the charge and no exceptions were filed 
to that part of the decision. 
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DC 82 reads that decision as an endorsement of the 
State's manual. This indeed may be correct, but only to 
the extent that we held that the State's manual correctly 
reflected its obligation to permit equal access for 
solicitat ion at a time reasonably proximate to when a 
4/ petition could be filed.— It does not follow that an 
employee organization seeking to supplant the incumbent 
violates any Taylor Law right of the incumbent union to 
quiet enjoyment of its representative status by soliciting 
a showing of interest on the employer's premises prior to 
the 90-day period. Neither does it follow that the State 
owed a Taylor Law duty to the incumbent employee 
) organization to prevent a challenger from entering upon its 
premises prior to that 90-day period. 
DC 82's reliance upon Gates-Chili CSD, 13 PERB ^3028 
(1980), is misplaced. It merely holds that a public 
employer is under no Taylor Law duty to permit equal access 
to a challenging organization except at times proximate to 
an election and that the grant of access privileges to such 
an organization at other times would interfere with 
employees' rights to be represented by the organization of 
their choice. Thus, whatever merits DC 82's argument 
i/cheektowaqa-Maryvale UFSD, 11 PERB ir3080, 1978, Affd. Mary vale 
Education Association v. Newman, 70 AD2d 758, 12 PERB V7009 (3d Dept., 
1979), Lv. to App. Den. 48 NY2d 605, 12 PERB T7018 (1979); Board of 
Education, Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda, 12 PERB 1f3055 (1979). 
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concerning its statutory right of quiet enjoyment might 
have at other times, it clearly has no application during 
the six-month period during which showing of interest 
5/ designation cards must be signed and dated.— Accordingly, 
while TUFCO may have violated a rule of the State, that 
alleged violation did not violate the Taylor Law. 
In their argument in support of their exceptions in 
the second case, the State and DC 82 assert that the State 
acted properly in confiscating the designation cards that 
had been obtained in violation of the State's rule. They 
contend that confiscation was reasonably necessary to deter 
further violations and to deny TUFCO the fruit of its 
wrongful conduct. 
The ALJ rejected the argument on the ground that there 
was a more pressing reason for the State not to confiscate 
the designation cards. That reason was the maintenance of 
the confidentiality of those cards. Citing with approval 
an opinion of the Ninth Circuit in NLRB V. Essex Wire 
Company. 245 F2d 589. 39 LRRM 2633 (1957). the ALJ ruled 
•i/see §201.4(b) of our Rules of Procedure. See 
also Great Neck UFSD. 11 PERB ir4517 (1978) at p. 4535-36, 
affirmed on other grounds at 11 PERB 1f3079 (1978) . The 
statutory rights of public employees during this period 
are set forth in County of Erie. 13 PERB 1f4605 (1980). 
affd. 13 PERB 1f3l05 (1980). 
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that maintenance of the confidentiality of the names of 
persons who signed the designation cards is an important 
protection under the labor relations statutes, including 
the Taylor Law. 
DC 82 contends that the ALJ erred in relying upon the 
Essex decision because §209-a.3 of the Taylor Law declares 
that private sector decisions shall not be regarded as 
binding precedent and maintenance of discipline by public 
employers is more important than maintenance of the 
confidentiality of designation cards. 
We find that the ALJ gave appropriate weight to Essex 
as well as to what may be special public sector 
) considerations. He did not rule that a public employer was 
prohibited under all circumstances from seizing designation 
cards. On the contrary, he indicated that the State had a 
legitimate interest in enforcing its solicitation rules and 
that it might be justified in confiscating cards if they 
were necessary evidence in a disciplinary proceeding for . 
violation of that rule. On the record before him. however, 
the ALJ determined that there was no such necessity because 
TUFCO admitted it solicited the cards on State property. 
Applying a balancing test, he therefore ruled that the 
confiscation of the cards at Fishkill constituted an 
improper practice. We affirm this determination. 
DC 82 asserts that even if the State erred in 
) confiscating the cards, it should not be required to return 
Board - U-7375/7385 
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them now. Instead, it should be directed to destroy them 
so that TUFCO cannot benefit from the action it took in 
violation of the State's order. 
There may be circumstances when a public employer 
jdqht properly destroy designation cards.L without:_lo_oJciiig_at 
them because the cards were obtained in violation of lawful 
rules. On the other hand, there may be circumstances when 
such cards can be used as part of a showing of interest, 
notwithstanding the manner in which they are obtained.— 
Noting that the issue was not presented by any of the 
charges before him, the ALJ declined to rule on whether the 
State could have properly destroyed TUFCO's cards instead 
of confiscating them. 
The exceptions relating to the remedy do not make this 
issue any more material. TUFCO has submitted a sufficient 
showing of interest in support of its current petition even 
without the designation cards that the State has been 
directed to return to it. Accordingly, DC 82's concern 
that TUFCO will use those cards for a purpose it considers 
improper is academic. Thus, there is no reason why we need 
consider DC 82's contention that the State should not 
return the cards which are TUFCO's property. 
^Compare State of New York. 15 PERB 1P014 (1982) 
, 948! 
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In part, TUFCO's complaint about the inadequacy of the 
ALJ's remedial order is the mirror image of DC 82's last 
exception. It argues that the order should have provided 
not only for the return of those designation cards, but for 
their being counted as part of its showing of interest. 
As we have said, however, the matter has become 
7/ academic — 
TUFCO also argues that the remedial order is 
inadequate in that it should have provided "more meaningful 
sanctions" against the State and for attorneys' fees. We 
reject this argument. Section 205.5(d) of the Taylor Law 
permits this Board to remedy improper practices by ordering 
appropriate relief, "but not to assess exemplary damages." 
TUFCO's request for "meaningful sanctions" is a request for 
exemplary damages. We also find no such unusual 
circumstances as would require the awarding of attorneys' 
8 / fees in the instant proceeding.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ and 
WE ORDER the State: 
27we also note that TUFCO did not make this 
argument before the ALJ. 
-''see Westburv Teachers Assn.. 14 PERB 1P063 (1981) 
Q 19, 
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1. To cease and desist from confiscating 
TUFCO designation cards, 
2. To immediately return to TUFCO the 
designation cards confiscated at 
Fishkill Correctional Facility on March 
4. 1984, and 
3. To post a notice in the form attached at 
all locations normally used for 
communication with employees at the 
Fishkill Correctional Facility. 
DATED: January 11, 198 5 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
EUBLIGEMRLOYMENT^RELATIONS-BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the Security Services Unit at the Fishkill Correctional 
Facility that the State of New York: 
1. Will not confiscate TUFCO designation cards. 
2. Will immediately return to TUFCO the designation 
cards confiscated on March 4, 1984. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. *~* 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS, 
Respondent. 
=and=J CASE NOS. 
U-7302 & U-7422 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS FIRE 
FIGHTERS UNION. LOCAL 343, IAFF. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES (JOSEPH T. KELLY), for 
Respondent 
GRASSO & GRASSO, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
of Saratoga Springs Fire Fighters Union, Local 343, IAFF, 
AFL-CIO, (Local 343) to the decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing two charges that it had filed 
against the City of Saratoga Springs (City). The charges 
had been consolidated for hearing and decision. 
The first charge alleges that the City violated 
§209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Taylor Law by reducing the 
number of fire fighters at its West Side Fire Station from 
four to three. It also alleges a violation of §209-a.l(c) 
in that the City disciplined Jack Dejnozka in retaliation 
\ 
946? 
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for his having protested the cut in minimum manning and 
engaged in other protected activities. 
Dejnozka was serving as Acting Lieutenant at the West 
Side station on January 21, 1984, when the staff reduction 
-went—into-effeat— In—that-capacity, he closed—the—station 
on the ground that for purposes of safety it was 
inadequately staffed. When the City directed that the 
station be reopened, Dejnozka declined to continue to serve 
as Acting Lieutenant and the other two fire fighters on 
duty there declined to assume that assignment. An off-duty 
fire fighter was called in to serve as Acting Lieutenant, 
and Dejnozka, the junior man at the West Side Station, was 
sent to the main station. He in turn bumped Gerald Ruhle, 
who was working at the main station in accordance with his 
normal schedule. Ruhle was told to take compensatory time 
off for overtime previously worked. Such a compensatory 
day off is called a Kelly Day. 
This precipitated Local 343"s second charge. It 
alleges that the City violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) in that 
there had been a past practice of Kelly Days being taken 
only at the employee's convenience. It also alleges a 
violation of §209-a.l(c) in that the imposition of the 
Kelly Day upon Ruhle was discriminatorily motivated. The 
basis of this specification is not any independent improper 
motivation with respect to Ruhle, but rather that it was a 
Board-U-7302/U-7422 -3 
consequence of the improper motivation involved in the 
transfer of Dejnozka. 
All the actions complained of occurred after December 
31, 1982. which is when the stated time frame of the 
pax-txesJ^prJLox—collective—bargainingagreement had—ended^ 
Dejnozka was a vice-president of Local 343 and a member of 
its team then negotiating a successor agreement. He also 
had an unspecified "personal involvement" in grievances and 
improper practices filed against the City. 
After closing the West Side Fire Station, Dejnozka 
complained about the unsafe working conditions to the news 
media. Local 343 asserts that these complaints were made 
in Dejnozka's capacity as a union officer and were, 
therefore, protected. It also alleges that the City 
brought disciplinary action against Dejnozka and suspended 
him without pay for 30 days by reason of his having engaged 
in protected activities. The protected activities that 
allegedly provoked the disciplinary action included 
Dejnozka's closing of the West Side station, his complaints 
to the media, his office in the union, his service on the 
union's negotiating team and his undisclosed role in 
grievances and improper practice cases. 
The record shows that Dejnozka's action in closing the 
West Side station was taken in his capacity of Acting 
Lieutenant. As such it was not protected by the Taylor 
Board-U-7302/U-7422 -4 
Law.— The record also shows that in complaining to the 
media about the allegedly unsafe conditions at the West 
Side Station, Dejnozka identified himself, not as a 
spokesman for Local 343, but as the Acting Lieutenant. 
Ind^ eA,_wh_en the ^re^^^ 
station closing grew out of a union/management problem, 
Dejnozka denied this and said that he had closed the 
station because: 
I was the officer in charge, I was the 
one that closed that West Side 
station, and I closed it due to unsafe 
working conditions and not union 
business. (emphasis supplied) 
On this evidence, the ALJ found that Dejnozka's statements 
) to the media were not protected. We affirm this finding. 
On the record before us, we conclude that the City's 
initiation of disciplinary proceedings was motivated by 
these two unprotected actions of Dejnozka and not by his 
membership on Local 343's negotiating committee, his office 
in that union or any involvement he may have had in prior 
grievances or improper practices. This conclusion is 
supported by the absence of any prior indication of animus 
borne by the City toward Local 343. 
i^This is not to suggest that such action would be 
protected if taken by a union representative. On the 
contrary, it might constitute a violation of §210.1 of the 
Taylor Law. See Penn Yan CSD. 13 PERB 1f3046 (1980) 
3*r 
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There is, however, an indication in the record that 
McGourty, the City's Commissioner of Public Safety, bore a 
personal animus toward Dejnozka. Dejnozka had campaigned "very 
hard." against McGourty's political election on two occasions. 
He had also filed a charge alleging a Human. Righ_ts_L_a_w 
violation against McGourty. Neither of these actions of 
2/ Dejnozka's is protected by the Taylor Law.— Thus, if 
McGourty's conduct were motivated by animus, the more 
reasonable likelihood is that the animus was personal rather 
than directed at Local 343, and, as such, it was not related to 
Dejnozka's exercise of activities protected by the Taylor Law. 
Much of Local 343*s argument in support of the §209-a.l(c) 
specification in the first charge is that there were 
improprieties in Dejnozka's disciplinary proceeding. To the 
extent that the charge complains about the alleged 
improprieties per se. the ALJ properly ruled that this Board 
has no jurisdiction over them. To the extent that the alleged 
improprieties might indicate an attempt to "get" Dejnozka, they 
do not establish animus toward Local 343. On the contrary, 
they would reflect McGourty's personal animus toward Dejnozka, 
unrelated to protected matters. 
^Town of Lake Luzerne, 11 PERB ir3094 (1978); Town of 
Oyster Bay. 14 PERB 1P002 (1980) affirming in pertinent part 
13 PERB ir4596 (1979); New York State Public Employees Federation 
(Farkas), 15 PERB 1P134 (1982), aff'd Farkas v. PERB. 
97 AD2d 569, 16 PERB tf7024 (3d Dep' t 1983) Mot for Lv to App, Den 
61 NY2d 601, 16 PERB ir7031 (1983). 
,- 9469 
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The §209-a.l(c) specification in the second charge is 
also without merit. Were we to find the City's transfer of 
Dejnozka to the main fire station to have been improper, the 
remedy would extend to the ripple effects of this 
impropriety, including its impact upon Ruhle. There is no 
basis, however, for such a finding. Dejnozka's transfer to 
the main station was directly attributable to the West Side 
Station being overstaffed when a new Acting Lieutenant had 
to be called in. There is also no basis for a finding of 
any independent improper motivation involving Ruhle. 
The §209-a.l(d) and (e) specifications of the first 
charge relate to the parties' prior collective bargaining 
agreement. Minimum manning was not expressly dealt with in 
it, but it had a past practices clause. According to Local 
343, minimum manning was a past practice that had been 
incorporated into the contract under that clause. 
As minimum manning is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation, the §209-a.l(d) specification must fall. This 
is because a public employer's unilateral change of a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation does not violate 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law.-'' The alleged §209-a.l(e) 
violation was dismissed by the ALJ because the agreement had 
an extension of benefits clause which provides: 
l^Board of Education of the City of New York. 5 PERB 
1f3054 (1972). 
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) 
If the parties hereto have failed to agree 
upon a new contract on or before December 
31. 1982, all of the terms and conditions 
set forth in this agreement and any 
supplements or modifications thereof shall 
continue in full force and effect until 
the date of execution of a new agreement. 
Thus, according to the ALJ, the contract is still in effect. 
Section 209-a.l(e) requires maintenance of the status quo 
after the expiration of an agreement. It is therefore 
inapplicable here. Local 343 being relegated to its remedy-
under the extended agreement. We affirm this conclusion. 
The §209-a.l(d) and (e) specifications of the second 
charge relate to another alleged past practice not 
specifically dealt with in the parties' agreement, that 
x Kelly Days may be taken only at the convenience of the 
employee and cannot be imposed by the employer. The 
§209-a.l(e) specification falls for the same reason that it 
does in the first charge; pursuant to its own terms, the 
parties were still covered by their contract. 
The §209-a.l(d) specification presents a different 
problem because the alleged unilateral charge involves a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. The ALJ dismissed the 
charge on the ground that it alleges nothing more than a 
contract violation, a matter over which this Board has no 
jurisdiction.— He acknowledges, however, in footnote 6 
of his decision, that we may have held otherwise in City of 
Buffalo. 17 PERB ir3090 (1984). 
) 
i/see CSL §205.5 and St. Lawrence County. 10 PERB 1F3058 (1977). 
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In Buffalo, we held that a unilateral change of a past 
practice during the life of an agreement might violate 
§209-a.l(d) if the contract did not deal with the matter 
explicitly, even if the contract covered it indirectly in a 
general past practices clause. This would be so when the 
charge was not based upon any alleged breach of contract but 
merely relied upon the alleged unilateral action. Thus, our 
jurisdiction was not affected by the existence of a relevant 
past practices clause which was not relied upon in the 
charge but disclosed during the processing of the proceeding. 
Such is the case here. The facts alleged in the charge 
assert the breach of an obligation flowing from the Taylor 
Law. Local 343 did not plead a breach of any contractual 
entitlement. Although, as noted by the ALJ, it did refer to 
the alleged breach in its post hearing brief, we do not read 
that reference as a reliance upon the contract as -a basis 
for its charge herein. 
As in Buffalo, we nevertheless decline to entertain 
this specification of the charge because the parties' 
agreement has a procedure for resolving the parallel 
contract dispute by arbitration. Accordingly, we defer to 
that procedure and dismiss this specification 
subject to its reinstatement should the City interpose 
objections to arbitrability or should an arbitration award 
not satisfy the standards for deferral which we delineated 
-, 9472 
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in New York City Transit Authority (Bordansky). 4 PERB 
ir303i(i97i).-/ 
NOW THEREFORE WE ORDER that the charges herein be and 
they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED:^jjanuary 11, 1985 __. 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies A Member 
JL^ In that case we said (at p. 3670): 
tl]n order for this Board in an improper 
practice proceeding to defer to an 
arbitration award it must be satisfied that 
the issues raised by the improper practice 
charge were fully litigated in the 
arbitration proceeding, that arbitral 
proceedings were not tainted by unfairness 
or serious procedural irregularities and 
that the determination of the arbitrator was 
not clearly repugnant to the purposes and 
policies of the Public Employees Fair 
Employment Act. 
Q3H 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION. AFL-CIO. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NOT^U^7657 
LOUIS C. ST. GEORGE, 
Charging Party. 
DOUGLAS L. WINOKUR. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
DECISION AND ORDER 
) 
The charge herein alleges that the Public Employees 
Federation. AFL-CIO violated its duty of fair representation 
in that it refused to appeal the denial of Louis C. St. 
George's grievance to Court. The grievance complained that 
by reason of his job assignments. St. George, an Unemployment 
Insurance Claims Examiner (salary grade 14). was entitled to 
the position of Senior Unemployment Insurance Claims Examiner 
(salary grade 18). 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation dismissed the charge on the ground that it did 
Board - U-7657 -2 
not set forth a violation of the duty of fair representation 
and the matter now comes to us on St. George's exceptions. 
Those exceptions make two arguments: (1) PEF did not 
ijiv^ _sj;J5at_e_the_gxieK^  
appeal to Court, and (2) PEF failed to notify St. George 
with sufficient expedition of its reasons for not taking the 
appeal. 
With respect to the first argument, St. George asserts 
that PEF erred in not verifying his allegations of out-of-title 
work by consulting with him and his supervisor. There is no 
indication, however, that PEF did not accept St. George's 
allegations of fact. On the face of the documents submitted by 
St. George, it appears that PEF concluded that his grievance 
was correctly denied notwithstanding his assignment of duties 
normally performed by a Senior Unemployment Insurance Claims 
Examiner. Its reason for this conclusion was that St. George's 
office did not have a Senior Unemployment Insurance Claims 
Examiner and was not entitled to one because of the small 
number of employees in that office. Thus, according to PEF, 
the only promotion at his office to which St. George could 
aspire was Office Manager, and the grievance did not make such 
a claim nor would the facts asserted by St. George support it. 
Board - U-7657 -3 
The question of the timing of PEF's refusal to appeal 
and of its notice to St. George raises some concern, as shown 
by the following timetable: 
3/22/84 The employer denied the_grlevance_ 
3/27/84 PEF so informed St. George. 
4/27/84 St. George requested PEF to take an appeal to 
Court. 
5/14/84 PEF acknowledged receipt of St. George's 
request and informed him that a decision would 
be made within four weeks. 
6/18/84 PEF informed St. George that it had decided 
not to appeal the grievance, but told him that 
he could appeal this decision to its Executive 
Director. 
6/22/84 St. George appealed PEF's decision to its 
Executive Director. 
7/13/84 PEF's Executive Director informed St. George 
that it would not take an appeal because there 
was "no substantial right to appeal." The 
Executive Director also told St. George that 
he could appeal on his own but that his time 
to do so would expire on July 22. 
7/20/84 St. George asked for a more detailed 
explanation of why PEF was not taking the 
appeal. It is alleged in the exceptions but 
not in the charge that St. George had 
consulted with a private attorney. The 
private attorney had told him that without 
knowing PEF's reasons for deciding not to 
appeal, he could not make an informed judgment 
as to the likelihood of a successful court 
proceeding within the short time remaining in 
which to appeal. 
7/30/84 PEF gave charging party a detailed explanation 
of why it was not taking the appeal. 
947§ 
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This Board has held, in Social Service Employees Union. 
Local 371. 11 PERB 1P004 (1978) and Nassau Educational 
Chapter. 11 PERB 1P010 (1978). that, to satisfy its duty of 
fair representation, a union refusing^ to process a grievance 
must communicate its reason for declining. This duty does 
not, however, contemplate a detailed statement such as PEF 
gave to St. George on July 30, 1984. For the purpose of 
meeting its duty, rt was sufficient for PEF to have informed 
St. George, as it did on July 13, 1984, of its conclusion 
that the grievance was without merit. 
The timing of PEF's notification of St. George that it 
considered the grievance without merit raises yet another 
question. PEF can be fairly criticized for the 52 days it 
took to decide not to appeal St. George's grievance after St. 
George made his request on April 27, 1984. We do not find, 
however, that this delay rises to the level of a violation of 
PEF's duty of fair representation. 
As we stated in Nassau Educational Chapter, supra, at p. 
a union violates its duty of fair representation if it fails 
to evaluate a unit employee's grievance and to notify him of 
such evaluation within a reasonable time "by reason of 
improper motives or of grossly negligent or irresponsible 
conduct . . . ." There is no evidence of improper motivation 
in the instant case and we do not find that the delay in 
Board - U-7657 
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notification herein amounts to gross negligence or 
irresponsible conduct.— 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: January 11. 1985 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
i^See also Brighton Transportation Association, 10 
PERB 3090 (1977), in which we said at p. 3155: 
"We believe that the procedures followed by BTA in 
deciding not to take the grievance to arbitration 
were more casual than they should have been. . . . 
However, the evidence does not indicate that BTA's 
conduct was improperly motivated or so negligent or 
irresponsible as to constitute a breach of the duty 
of fair representation." 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both the 
Town of Evans (Town) and the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, Local 41. (IBEW) to the decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Town refused 
to negotiate with IBEW and that it unilaterally replaced 
employees in IBEW's negotiating unit with nonunit employees 
who were assigned the same work.— The ALJ ordered the 
l^The charge also complained that the Town fired some 
unit employees and reassigned others in retaliation for their 
having sought to organize. The ALJ determined that the record 
evidence did not support these specifications of the charge and 
IBEW did not file exceptions to this part of her decision. 
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Town to reinstate two replaced employees (Marchant and 
Rosenlund) on the ground that they were fired merely because 
their work was reassigned. She did not order the 
reinstatement of seven other replaced employees (Forge, Zoda, 
Cafferty, Austin, Basher, McNeal, and Kiefer) on_t_h_e_crxxxund 
that 
[t]hey were terminated for political or 
personal reasons apart from any decision to 
reassign their work to nonunit employees 
and they would not be employed even if 
their duties were not transferred out of 
the unit. 
She therefore ordered only that their work be reassigned to 
other unit employees. 
The Town argues that it was under no duty to negotiate 
with IBEW because IBEW had never been recognized or 
2/ 
certified.— Thus, according to the Town, its unilateral 
action could not constitute a violation of any obligation to 
negotiate. It also argues that the ALJ erred in ordering the 
reinstatement of Rosenlund. Its reason is that his work was 
reassigned to Galfo, who replaced him as a unit employee. 
IBEW argues that the ALJ erred in not ordering the 
reinstatement of the seven unit employees who were 
£/lBEW acknowledges that it was not certified. 
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replaced.— It also argues that the ALJ erred in not 
finding a separate violation by the Town in that it did not 
negotiate the impact of its unilateral transfers of unit work. 
The Town's defense to IBEW's allegations of refusal to 
negotiate its unilateral action focuses attention upon a 
meeting of the lame duck Town Board held on December 29, 
1983. at which a majority voted to recognize IBEW. That 
meeting was not regularly scheduled and has been variously 
characterized as an adjourned meeting and a special meeting 
by the Town and IBEW respectively. 
The prior regular meeting had been held on December 21, 
1983. A proposal to recognize IBEW was made at that meeting, 
but as it had not been on the agenda, a four/fifth's vote was 
necessary to suspend the Town Board's rules of order in order 
to permit a vote on the proposal. Only three of the five 
Board members voted to suspend the rules and the proposal was 
not considered. 
At the end of the meeting, by a vote of three to two, 
the Town Board voted to: 
Adjourn to Thursday, December 29. 1983 at 4:00 p.m. 
for the purpose of discussing and taking action on 
union recognition and any other Town business that 
needs action. 
1/lt does not contest the determination of the ALJ 
that three other replaced employees (Herman, Rammacher and 
Johnston) should not be reinstated. The ALJ ordered the 
reassignment of Herman's work to unit employees but not 
that of Rammacher and Johnston, there being no showing that 
their work had been given to nonunit personnel. 
s94S£ 
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The Town argues that the meeting of December 29 was therefore 
an adjourned meeting, which means a continuation of the 
December 21 meeting. Thus, according to the Town, it was 
subject to the same agenda limitations, and the Town Board 
could not recognize IBEW on December 29 because there had not 
been a four/fifth's vote in favor of a waiver of the rules 
which would have permitted an expansion of the agenda. 
IBEW argues that the adjourned meeting of December 29, 
1983, was a special meeting and not merely a continuation of 
the meeting of December 21. 1983. Among other things, it 
points out that the notice of the December 29 meeting posted 
by the Town Clerk designated it "a special meeting" as do the 
Town Clerk's minutes of that meeting. Scaglione. one of the 
Town Board members who voted to recognize IBEW, testified 
that any meeting of the Town Board other than those regularly 
scheduled on the first and third Wednesdays of each month had 
been considered special meetings. More importantly. Cook, 
the Town Supervisor and one of the two members of the Board 
who voted against recognition, confirmed Scaglione's 
testimony.— We therefore conclude that pursuant to the 
practices of the Town Board, the meeting of December 29, 
i-^ See record, page 841. 
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1983, was a special meeting and not merely a continuation of 
the meeting of December 21, 1983. Accordingly, consideration 
of the recognition of IBEW was not barred. 
The Town next argues that if the meeting of December 29, 
1983 were a special meeting, it had been called improperly 
and was, therefore, a nullity. The basis of this argument is 
Town Law §62 which provides: 
The supervisor of any town may. and upon 
written request of two members of the board, 
shall within ten days, call a special 
meeting of" the town board by giving at least 
two days' notice in writing to members of 
the board of the time when and the place 
where the meeting is to be held. 
The special meeting of December 29, 1983, was not called by 
the Town Supervisor. On the contrary, she was one of the two 
members of the Town Board who voted against calling the 
meeting. 
We do not, however, find that the recognition of IBEW at 
that meeting was a nullity. The Attorney General has written 
that the purpose of the requirements in §62 is to assure 
notice of special meetings to all Town Board members and 
"[t]he presence of all members of your Town Board at the 
meeting in question seems to me to satisfy that 
requirement."— Thus, according to the Attorney 
IL/1950 Informal Opinions of the Attorney General, 
page 117. 
Board - U-7344 -6 
General, an appointment made at a special meeting not called 
in the manner required by Town Law §62 was nevertheless 
proper where all the Board Members had notice of the meeting 
and attended. That reasoning is applicable here. Here too, 
all the members of the Town Board had notice of the meeting 
of December 29, 1983, and attended. 
Even if the action of the Town Board on December 29, 
1983 recognizing IBEW were not sufficient to satisfy the Town 
Law or the Town Board's rules of" procedure, we would 
nevertheless affirm the determination of the ALJ that it was 
sufficient to constitute a recognition under the Taylor Law. 
While a failure to comply with the technical provisions of 
^ the Town Law and the Town Board's rules might lead to the 
conclusion that there had been no formal legislative act of 
recognition, we would find an informal expression of the Town 
Board sufficient for recognition pursuant to the Taylor Law. 
The Appellate Division has stated that "[b]efore there can be 
recognition there must be some objective evidence of 
acceptance by the authority empowered to extend 
recognition."— The majority vote of the Town Board 
satisfies this requirement. 
We affirm the determination of the ALJ that the Town's 
failure to negotiate the impact of its unilateral transfers 
6/Town of Clay v. Helsby, 45 AD2d 292. 7 PERB ir7012, 
at p. 7020, (4th Dep't. 1974). 
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of unit work did not constitute an independent violation of 
the Taylor Law. IBEW argues that the ALJ erred in finding 
that its failure to make impact demands precluded a finding 
of a separate violation. It contends that, given the Town's 
refusal to negotiate with it at all, such a demand would have 
been futile. It further contends that the Taylor Law does 
not require the making of a futile demand as a condition for 
establishing a duty to negotiate. 
Underlying the decision of the ALJ is an awareness that 
the impact demands that IBEW could have made might have 
included nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, in which event 
the Town would not have had to negotiate them. She therefore 
found no separate violation by reason of the Town's failure 
to negotiate impact demands that were never made. 
The ALJ's reasoning was particularly appropriate here, 
the ALJ having determined that, on January 6. 1984, the Town 
refused to meet with IBEW for the purpose of engaging in 
negotiations. That refusal, which the ALJ found to 
constitute a violation of the Taylor Law, extended to all 
negotiations. The finding of a violation therefore 
encompasses all mandatory subjects of negotiation, including 
proper impact demands. 
We affirm the determination of the ALJ that Rosenlund 
should be reinstated because his work was transferred to a 
nonunit employee. Galfo, Rosenlund's replacement as water 
foreman, was appointed temporary water foreman at a meeting 
, 948! 
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of the Town Board held on January 1, 1984. At that meeting. 
Town Supervisor Cook took the position that Galfo was not in 
the unit. Moreover, within a month all doubt was removed 
when Galfo was given a new nonunit title for doing the same 
work. On these facts we conclude that the.._Town_h.ad_nev-ex 
intended Rosenlund's work to be performed by a unit employee. 
Having reviewed the record we affirm the ALJ ' s 
determination that Forge, Zoda. Cafferty, Austin, Basher, 
McNeal and Kiefer were all fired because of political reasons 
or personal reasons unrelated to the transfer of their work 
to nonunit employees. Accordingly, we affirm her 
determination not to order their reinstatement. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Town of Evans to: 
1. Offer to reinstate immediately Edwin 
Marchant and Herman Rosenlund under 
their prior terms and conditions of 
employment and make them whole for any 
loss of wages and benefits sustained as 
the result of their termination, with 
interest at the legal rate; 
2. Restore immediately to unit employees 
the duties which had been performed by 
Norma Forge, Deanna Zoda, Diana 
Cafferty, Vieva Austin, Karen Basher, 
Mary McNeal. Elmer Kiefer and Kenneth 
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Herman, and which were transferred to 
nonunit employees; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, Local 41; 
4. Cease and desist from the assignment of 
unit work to nonunit employees. 
5. Post the attached notice at all places 
normally used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
DATED: January 11. 1985 
Albany. New York 
£^**_ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
?W^/W 
David C. Randies, Membe 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND OftDER OF THE 
!EW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to affaciuats the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
w© hereby notify employees within the unit represented by the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 41, that the Town 
of Evans will: 
(1) Offer to reinstate immediately Edwin Marchant and Herman 
Rosenlund under their prior terms and conditions of employment 
and make them whole for any loss of wages and benefits sustained 
as the result of their termination, with interest at the legal 
rate; 
(2) Restore immediately to unit employees the duties which had been 
performed by Norma Forge, Deanna Zoda, Diana Cafferty, Vieva 
Austin, Karen Basher, Mary McNeal. Elmer Kiefer and Kenneth 
Herman, and which were transferred to nonunit employees. 
(3) Negotiate in good faith with the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers. Local 41; 
(4) Not assign unit work to nonunit employees. 
TOWN OF EVANS 
Dated. By. 
(Reprssentativft) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be alterea 
defaced, or covered by any other material. *%m^r\ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I v ' 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
BOARD OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7479 
ORGANIZATION OF STAFF ANALYSTS. 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion made by the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District) for permission to file exceptions to an 
interlocutory order of an Administrative Law Judge.— 
During the course of a hearing held on September 14, 
1984, on the charge herein brought by the Organization of 
Staff Analysts (OSA) against the District, the District had 
moved to suppress testimony on the ground that it related to 
confidential communications between a client and her attorney 
and was thereby privileged under CPLR §4503. Before ruling 
1/section 204=7(h) of PERB's Rules of Procedure 
provides: 
All motions and rulings made at the hearing 
shall be part of the record of the 
proceeding and, unless expressly authorized 
by the Board, shall not be appealed directly 
I ) to the Board but shall be considered by the 
Board whenever the case is submitted to it 
for decision, (emphasis supplied) 
n 
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on that motion the ALJ recessed the hearing and invited the 
parties to submit memoranda of law addressing the question 
whether the testimony sought involved confidential 
communications. Both parties submitted such memoranda and. 
on November 27, 1984, the ALJ issued his decision concluding 
that the communications were not confidential and therefore 
not privileged. A continuation of the hearing was then 
7 / 
scheduled for January 15, 1985.— 
The motion herein is undated and was delivered to us 
some six weeks later, on January 9, 1985. As a consequence, 
OSA has not been afforded an opportunity to submit papers 
responding to the motion that could be considered by us 
before the scheduled date of the resumption of the hearing. 
Under these circumstances we determine that it would be 
inappropriate to grant the District's motion. 
NOW THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the motion herein be, and 
it hereby is denied. 
DATED: January 11. 1985 
Albany, New York 
^^m^^y-^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies AMember 
^The District's motion also seeks a stay of that 
hearing. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LEVITTOWN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
—and- CASEHNO^C^275F 
LEVITTOWN UNITED TEACHERS, LOCAL 1383. 
NYSUT, AFT. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Levittown United Teachers. 
Local 1383. NYSUT, AFT has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who in 
the immediately preceding school year 
have received a reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment as referenced in 
Civil Service Law Section 201.7(d). 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer. 
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Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Levittown United Teachers, 
Local 1383. NYSUT. AFT and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions oi: 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of. and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: January 11. 1985 
Albany, New York 
JLA^^/C. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
